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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
ENTERING A DEFAULT JUDGMENT THAT DID NOT INCLUDE 
APPELLANT'S CHECK COLLECTION FEE? 
A trial court's award of costs and the disallowance of a particular item as a 
cost is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Stevenett v. Wal-Mart 




L THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
ENTERING A DEFAULT JUDGMENT THAT DID NOT INCLUDE 
APPELLANT'S CHECK COLLECTION FEE. 
The Appellant's brief makes two primary arguments: (a) the Tholen case 
established a definition of "all costs of collection" that is dispositive of this matter; 
and (b) the District Court misread the plain language of the statute. Appellant's 
arguments fail for three reasons: (a) the Tholen case said nothing about whether a 
collection agency's collection fee is recoverable as "costs"; (b) the District Court 
acted within its broad discretion and consistent with applicable Utah case law in 
refusing to tax a collection fee as "costs"; and (c) the plain language of the Utah 
Bad Check Law does not compel a trial court to award a check collection agency 
its collection fee. 
A. The Case of Tholen v. Sandy City and Southridge Special 
Improvement District is Not Dispositive of Any Issue in this Appeal. 
Appellant argues that the case of Tholen v. Sandy City and Southridge 
Special Improvement District, 849 P.2d 592, 596 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), is 
dispositive of this matter. However, the issue in Tholen is entirely unrelated to the 
issue before the Court in this appeal. The issue in Tholen was whether a statute 
providing for recovery of costs allowed the prevailing party to recover attorney's 
fees. See id. at 595. The Tholen Court concluded that, because the statue at issue 
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in that case did not expressly provide for the recovery of attorney's fees, those fees 
could not be recovered as "costs." See id. at 596. The issue in this case is whether 
the statutory language allowing for recovery of "all costs of collection, including 
all court costs and attorney's fees" required the District Court to award Appellant 
its check collection fee. Not only is Tholen not dispositive of the issue in this 
case, Tholen is not even relevant. The fact that the Court of Appeals in Tholen 
distinguished "costs" from "attorney's fees" does not lead to the conclusion that 
"costs" must, as a matter of law, include a check collection agency's collection 
fees. 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Refusing to 
Award Appellant a Check Collection Fee. 
The only issue properly before this Court is whether the District Court erred 
in refusing to tax as "costs" the expenses Appellant claims to have incurred as a 
result of its collection efforts.1 Under well established Utah law, "the allowance 
or disallowance of a particular item as a cost falls within the sound discretion of 
1
 Appellant is attempting to frame the issue before this Court as whether the 
Judges of the District Court can lawfully adopt a uniform policy regarding the 
interpretation of a statute. However, Appellant failed to raise in the District Court 
the issue of the Judges' authority to adopt the January 10, 2000 memorandum as 
official court policy. In fact, counsel for Appellant, when arguing before the 
District Court, expressly acknowledged that "the policy is fair as far as it goes." 
Hearing Transcript, Nov. 29, 2000 at 5. The issue of the policy's lawfulness has 
therefore not been properly preserved for appeal. Whether or nor such a policy 
was lawful, Judge Fratto made it very clear at the hearing that he considered 
himself authorized to deviate from that policy. See id. at 4. Accordingly, the 
District Court did not blindly adhere to the policy but merely, in its broad 
discretion, disallowed a particular item as "costs." The decision is therefore 
subject to review only as an abuse of discretion. See Stevenett v. Wal-Mart 
Stores. Inc., 977 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
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the trial court." Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 977 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999). See also Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
What the Appellant seeks to recover as "costs" in this appeal are the 
expenses it claims to have incurred as a result of its check collection efforts. Such 
expenses are not taxable "costs" under Utah law. This Court, in Frampton v. 
Wilson, discussed the 
distinction to be understood between the legitimate and 
taxable "costs" and other "expenses" of litigation 
which may be ever so necessary but are not properly 
taxable as costs. 
605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). The fees Appellant seeks to 
recover are more appropriately described not as taxable "costs," but rather as other 
"expenses" Appellant has incurred. The District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to tax Appellant's collection fees as costs in the default judgment 
against Appellee. 
In fact, the Amicus Curiae has found no Utah case law holding that such 
expenses are appropriately taxable as costs, let alone case law mandating that such 
expenses be so taxed. Rather, Utah case law suggests that those items properly 
taxable as costs are "those fees which are required to be paid to the court and to 
witnesses." Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980. The Appellant's 
collection fees are not "required to be paid to the court," nor are they payments to 
witnesses. While Utah courts have allowed other expenses to be taxed as costs, 
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such expenses have generally been limited to costs of depositions and related 
expenses, and each claim for costs is evaluated on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., 
Morgan, 795 P.2d at 687 (declining to tax accounting and appraisal fees as 
"costs"). 
Utah courts have been reluctant to expand the range of expenses that may 
be taxed as costs; that reluctance is consistent with this Court's charge that a trial 
court "has a duty to guard against any excesses or abuses in the taxing" of costs. 
Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774. A trial court cannot possibly guard against excesses or 
abuses if it has no discretion to determine, in a particular case, what items may be 
properly labeled as "costs." The District Court in this matter properly heeded this 
Court's warning and did not abuse its discretion in disallowing Appellant's 
collection fees as costs. 
C. Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 Does Not Compel a Trial Court to Award 
Check Collection Fees in a Default Judgment. 
Appellant's attempt to frame the issue before this Court as one of statutory 
construction is flawed because it assumes the District Court decided more than it 
actually did. The District Court did not rule that no "costs" other than court costs 
could ever be recovered under the Bad Check Law. Rather, the District Court 
merely held that the Appellant's collection expenses were not, in this particular 
case, recoverable as "costs." In fact, the District Court gave Appellant the 
opportunity to file, after a final ruling, an affidavit explaining how the collection 
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expenses were incurred.2 See Hearing Transcript, Nov. 29, 2000 at 9. Appellant 
never filed an affidavit and thus never articulated to the District Court any reason 
why its expenses should be taxed as "costs." The District Court therefore had no 
reason to find that Appellant's collection fees were anything more than 
"expenses," and were thus unrecoverable. 
Accordingly, the only ruling the District Court actually made concerning 
the language of the Bad Check Law was, by implication, that the Bad Check Law 
does not compel a trial court to award a collection agency's expenses as costs in a 
default judgment. That holding is entirely accurate because the Bad Check Law 
does not expressly provide that collection agency's fees are included in the 
definition of "collection costs." The only items expressly included as "collection 
costs" are court costs and attorney's fees, both of which Appellant was awarded. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 (7)(b)(iii). The District Court's interpretation is also 
consistent with the plain language of the statute which allows a trial court to 
"waive all or part of the amounts owed under Subsections 7(b)(ii) through (iv) 
upon a finding of good cause." Id. § 7-15-l(7)(c). Thus, even if a collection 
agency's fees are recoverable as costs, a trial court has discretion to waive them 
and is therefore not compelled to award those fees in a final judgment. 
2
 Appellant could also have submitted an affidavit setting forth the basis for its 
claim for "costs" with its proposed judgment, but Appellant chose not to do so. 
Appellant has not explained why it has never, despite an express invitation from 




Additionally, it would now be inconsistent for Appellants to argue that the 
Bad Check law requires the trial court to award collection expenses in all cases, 
regardless of whether the plaintiff has provided any evidence explaining how and 
why those expenses were incurred. During the hearing regarding this matter 
before the District Court, counsel for Appellant acknowledged that there have 
been "some abuses with collection costs . . . [a]nd definitely those should be 
stopped." Hearing Transcript, Nov. 29, 2000 at 10. A trial court cannot possibly 
stop abuses with collection costs if it has no discretion under the Bad Check Law 
to deny such expenses in appropriate cases. 
Appellant argues that if "costs of collection" as used in the Utah Bad Check 
Law does not include Appellant's $20.08 per check collection fee then a collection 
agent "has lost his incentive to sue." Appellant's Brief at 17. That argument is 
entirely without merit because the Bad Check Law allows for the recovery of (a) 
the amount of the check, (b) interest, (c) court costs and attorney's fees, and (d) 
damages equaling the greater of $100.00 per check or triple the check amount. 
The "original payee" of the check is thus more than made whole even if it does not 
receive a collection fee, and has ample additional funds from which to compensate 
the check collection agency. 
Moreover, there is nothing in the Bad Check Law to prevent an agent from 
contracting with the "original payee" to received a fixed fee for its collection 
efforts. The fact that the statute precludes an "original payee" from contracting 
"for a person to retain any amounts charged or collected" as damages in no way 
6 
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prevents an "original payee" from simply contracting to pay the agent a fixed fee 
for its services if a matter progresses to litigation. Thus, Appellant must simply 
reevaluate the manner in which it secures payment for its services; it seems 
doubtful that Appellant will lose all incentive to sue if its expenses are not taxable 
as "costs." 
Indeed, one can only presume that Appellant already has a system whereby 
it is compensated in a manner that allows it some profit. During the hearing 
before the District Court, Appellant's stated that the $20.08 collection fee is "only 
[Appellant's] costs of collection. There's no profit involved, it's just - - it just 
brings [Appellant] back to even." Hearing Transcript, Nov. 29, 2000 at 9. 
Assuming Appellant is not a nonprofit corporation, Appellant must have some 
arrangement with its customers that allows it to be a profitable enterprise. 
Accordingly, even if the $20.08 per check charge only covers Appellant's "costs," 
there is no reason why Appellant cannot amend its contractual arrangements to 




For the reasons set forth above, the Amicus Curiae respectfully submit that 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion by entering a default judgment that 
did not include Appellant's check collection fee. 
DATED this J 0 _ day of August, 2001. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
David A. Greenwood 
Evan S. Strassbgrg 
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